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The phenomenology of inner speech: comparison
of schizophrenia patients with auditory verbal
hallucinations and healthy controls
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Background. Despite the popularity of inner-speech theories of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), little is
known about the phenomenological qualities of inner speech in patients with schizophrenia who experience AVHs
(Sz-AVHs), or how this compares to inner speech in the non-voice-hearing general population.
Method. We asked Sz-AVHs (n=29) and a non-voice-hearing general population sample (n=42) a series of
questions about their experiences of hearing voices, if present, and their inner speech.
Results. The inner speech reported by patients and controls was found to be almost identical in all respects.
Furthermore, phenomenological qualities of AVHs (e.g. second- or third-person voices) did not relate to
corresponding qualities in inner speech.
Conclusions. No discernable diﬀerences were found between the inner speech reported by Sz-AVHs and healthy
controls. Implications for inner-speech theories of AVHs are discussed.
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Introduction
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) have been
part of the tapestry of human experience for many
millennia. Despite recent advances in our under-
standing of the phenomenology of voice-hearing, the
cognitive mechanisms behind AVHs remain in debate.
One popular contemporary cognitive account is that
AVHs result from the misattribution of the voice-
hearer’s own inner speech to another (Frith et al. 1999 ;
Seal et al. 2004 ; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a, b). On this
view, AVHs, like other ‘ loss of boundary’ experiences,
reﬂect a failure to monitor the intentional instigation of
actions. In the case of AVHs the act in question is inner
self-talk. The inner-speech account is thus consistent
with deﬁnitions of inner speech as ‘ thinking in words’
(McGuire et al. 1995, p. 596) or ‘verbal thought ’
(Vygotsky, 1987) and the dominant philosophical view
that thinking, in general, as distinct from imagery, is
the act of using language to talk to oneself internally
(see, for example, Wiley, 2006). Other theories of
AVHs take a diﬀerent view of the cognitive causes of
the experience. For example, Waters et al. (2006) have
argued that AVHs result from a combined failure to
inhibit and to correctly source a wide range of mental
events including irrelevant memories and involuntary
intrusive ruminations.
Inner speech in patients with schizophrenia who
experience AVHs (Sz-AVHs) has been the subject of
much neuroimaging research, with evidence of dif-
ferences in neural activation between Sz-AVHs and
healthy non-voice-hearing controls when participants
image inner speech, particularly other people speak-
ing (see Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a, for a review).
Studies have also investigated how inner speech
in Sz-AVHs may come to be experienced as alien,
with evidence emerging of externalizing attributional
biases speciﬁc to Sz-AVHs (Allen et al. 2006). Despite
these advances, there remains a signiﬁcant blind spot
in research into inner speech in those with AVHs.
Speciﬁcally, there remains very little literature on the
everyday experience of inner speech in Sz-AVHs, and
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how, if at all, it may diﬀer from the corresponding
experiences of healthy individuals who do not ex-
perience AVHs.
What little is known about the phenomenology
of inner speech in schizophrenia can be surmised
from the work of Hurlburt (1990). Hurlburt asked four
individuals with schizophrenia to reﬂect upon and
describe their inner world at random intervals, as sig-
nalled by a beeper. As part of this task patients re-
ported on their inner speech. Of the four patients
surveyed, only two experienced AVHs. One reported
AVHs that were ‘occasionally dimly present ’ (p. 157),
whereas another ‘ frequently heard voices … which
she understood to be the voices of beings she called
gods’. The former patient frequently reported inner
verbal experiences ‘entirely similar to those given by
non-schizophrenic subjects ’ (p. 191), whereas the lat-
ter, who frequently heard second- and third-person
AVHs, reported inner speech as being in her own
voice with the same vocal characteristics as if she were
speaking aloud. These ﬁndings are limited by the
small clinical sample and the lack of a systematic
examination of the properties of inner speech in Sz-
AVHs and psychiatrically healthy individuals.
The present study aimed to redress these limitations
by using a semi-structured interview to examine the
phenomenological qualities of inner speech in a
larger sample of Sz-AVHs and a control sample of
healthy non-voice-hearing adults. We were particu-
larly interested in addressing questions that follow
from the inner-speech theory of AVHs, particularly
those surrounding the quantity, form and pragmatics
of inner speech. We also sought for the ﬁrst time to
examine concordance between inner-speech and
voice-hearing experiences in Sz-AVHs.
Following Lysaker & Lysaker (2005), who proposed
less inner speech in Sz-AVHs than in the general
population, as a result of hallucinatory voices inter-
rupting the regular ﬂow of inner speech, we ﬁrst hypo-
thesized that less inner speech would be reported
by Sz-AVHs than controls. An associated hypothesis
was that the frequency of inner speech in Sz-AVHs
would correlate negatively with the frequency of
their AVHs. With regard to the form of inner
speech, Fernyhough (2004) uses Vygotskian ideas to
distinguish between expanded inner speech (in
which the internally conducted dialogue retains the
give-and-take structure of external dialogue, and is
conducted in syntactically complete utterances) and
condensed inner speech (in which dialogic utterances
are abbreviated into a fragmentary, condensed series
of verbal images or words and phrases). On this
view, AVHs result when condensed inner speech is
re-expanded under conditions of stress and cognitive
challenge, with the resulting dialogue subsequently
misattributed to external voices. We thus hypoth-
esized that Sz-AVHs should report less expanded
inner speech than healthy controls, and should hence
be less likely to report thinking in complete sentences.
With regard to the pragmatics of AVHs, we focused
on the terms of address used by voices to refer to the
patients, and whether similar terms of address also
occur in inner speech. If inner speech is the origin of all
AVHs, including voices commenting and voices con-
versing, there should be consistency between the use
of second-person (‘you’) and third-person (‘he/she’)
pronouns (when referring to self) in inner speech and
the frequency of second-person and third-person
AVHs. We thus hypothesized that patients who report
voices commenting should also report using ‘you’ to
refer to self in inner speech, whereas patients who
report voices conversing should also report using ‘he/
she’ to refer to self in inner speech. Finally, we ex-
pected concordance between the phenomenological
qualities of Sz-AVHs’ voices (e.g. vocal characteristics
such as perceived gender, whether they were in the
second or third person, and their form, speed and
volume) and their inner speech. For example, if
Sz-AVHs’ voices predominantly addressed them as
‘you’ we expected that in their inner speech such in-
dividuals would also predominantly address them-
selves as ‘you’.
Method
Participants
Twenty-nine clinical participants (15 male, 14 male)
with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizo-
aﬀective disorder who reported the experience of
hearing voices were recruited from out-patient
clinics of the Sydney South West Area Health
Service (SWAHS), with the assistance of the SWAHS
Schizophrenia Research Unit, and from the
Volunteer Research Register administered by the
Schizophrenia Research Institute of Australia (www.
schizophreniaresearch.org.au). All patients were on
stable doses of antipsychotic medication. The ex-
clusion criteria were prominent thought disorder,
current substance abuse, known mental retardation,
and presence of a clinically signiﬁcant head injury.
Clinical demographics are reported in Table 1.
Forty-two healthy controls (24 male, 18 female)
matched to the clinical participants on age, sex and IQ,
and assessed using the National Adult Reading Test
(NART; Nelson &Willison, 1991), were recruited from
the general community (see Table 1).
All participants were Australian-born and had good
English skills, and more than 8 years of formal edu-
cation. All participants gave informed consent and the
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study was approved by the local research ethics com-
mittees.
Materials and procedure
Severity of the patients’ current symptoms was as-
sessed on the day of testing using the Scales for
the Assessment of Positive and Negative Symptoms
(SAPS/SANS; Andreasen, 1984a, b). To probe the
properties of participants’ inner speech and the voices
of the patients, we followed the work of Leudar et al.
(1997), as well as Nayani & David (1996), and devel-
oped a semi-structured ‘Voices and Inner Speech
Interview’ to test our study hypotheses (available on
request). Structured questions were posed initially
with follow-up clariﬁcation if required. The partici-
pants’ verbatim responses to the questions, which
were posed alongside the response options, were used
to code their responses.
The ﬁrst half of the interview dealt with the
properties of any AVHs experienced by the partici-
pants, and the second half dealt with participants’
inner-speech experiences. The questions used in the
ﬁrst half were based in large part on Nayani & David’s
(1996) interview; we asked about the number of
voices, their frequency, the type of utterances (a few
words, a few sentences, or on and on continuously for
a while), the perceived gender, age, accent and class of
the voices, and the speed and volume of the voices, as
well as the identity of voices and their intelligibility
(i.e. understandable or garbled). We also asked some
new questions about terms of address. If patients
conﬁrmed the presence of voices commenting when
asked, ‘Does it feel like each voice is talking directly to
you? Or is it more like you’re just hearing words that
aren’t necessarily meant directly for you?’, they were
then asked of these voices, ‘Do the voice(s) ever call
you by name?’, ‘Do the voice(s) use the word ‘you’
when they are talking directly to you?’ Similarly, the
patients who reported voices conversing were asked
whether the voices used the patients’ ﬁrst name or
‘he/she’ when referring to them in conversation.
The second half of the interview was entirely new.
The questions were structured similarly to the ques-
tions about voices in the ﬁrst half. We introduced the
second half as follows: ‘Now I’d like to ask you some
questions about what it’s like when you’re thinking
about things in your mind, like when you’re thinking
through a problem for example. ’ If a participant re-
ported AVHs, we then added, ‘ I don’t mean your
voices now. That’s diﬀerent. What we’re talking about
now is what it’s like when you’re just thinking things
Table 1. Demographics for patients with AVHs, and controls
Patient group
(n=29)
Controls
(n=42)
Age (S.D.)a 41.21 (10.89) 36.76 (13.11)
IQ – NART (S.D.)a 105.55 (10.32) 107.11 (9.90)
Gender ratio (F/M)a 1 :1.33 1 :1.07
Age of onset (years) 25.21 (7.64) N.A.
Duration of illness (years since
ﬁrst admission)
15.79 (8.76) N.A.
Auditory hallucinations (SAPS item 1)b 2.59 (2.19) N.A.
Somatic or tactile hallucinations (SAPS item 4)b 0.24 (0.99) N.A.
Olfactory hallucinations (SAPS item 5)b 0.45 (0.91) N.A.
Visual hallucinations (SAPS item 6)b 0.97 (1.66) N.A.
Global delusions (SAPS item 20)b 3.06 (1.48) N.A.
Global positive thought disorder
(SAPS item 34)b
1.20 (1.04) N.A.
Negative symptomsc 1.71 (0.83) N.A.
Medicationd (typical :atypical) 4 :25 N.A.
AVHs, Auditory verbal hallucinations ; NART, National Adult Reading Test ;
SAPS/SANS, Scales for the Assessment of Positive/Negative Symptoms ;
S.D., standard deviation ; N.A., not applicable.
a Patients and control groups did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly on this variable.
bMean score according to SAPS category.
cMean of global SANS scores for alogia, anhedonia, inappropriate aﬀect, avolition
and aﬀective ﬂattening.
d Chlorpromazine equivalents were not available for all medications.
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over. ’ We then went on to ask more speciﬁc questions
as shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Results
AVHs in patients
Of the 29 patients, 12 experienced hearing their voices
daily, seven weekly and the remaining 10 less fre-
quently. Of the 26 Sz-AVHs who reported voices
commenting, 16 reported the voices using their ﬁrst
name and 15 reported the voices using ‘you’. Of the
14 who reported voices conversing, eight heard their
own name being discussed and eight heard ‘he/she’
being used to refer to them in conversation between
the voices.
Frequency and other characteristics of inner speech
in Sz-AVHs and controls
All participants could reﬂect upon at least some as-
pects of their inner-speech experiences and reported
no diﬃculties with understanding the questions
listed in Tables 2 and 3. We did not collect conﬁdence
ratings for each response because this would have
lengthened the interview considerably and would
have disrupted the introspection of the participants.
Of further note, the patients reported no diﬃculties
with distinguishing between their inner-speech and
their voice-hearing experiences. Comparisons be-
tween Sz-AVHs and the non-voice-hearing controls
were analyzed using Fisher’s exact probability test.
Frequency
No participants (patients or controls) rated the fre-
quency of thinking things over in their mind as ‘rarely
happens’ (only one patient answered ‘unsure ’). The
frequency diﬀered signiﬁcantly between Sz-AVHs
and healthy controls. Although the controls pre-
dominantly reported inner speech several times a day,
the patients were more varied, being more likely to
report both non-stop/always thinking and infrequent
levels of thinking things over than the controls. Fur-
ther analysis was performed to investigate whether
the results diﬀered in the patients who heard ﬁve or
more voices (14) and the results remained equally
variable and not diﬀerent from the controls.
Form
There were no group diﬀerences in reported form of
inner speech. Both Sz-AVHs and controls were most
likely to report thinking in full sentences. Of the 14 Sz-
AVHs who heard ﬁve or more voices, ﬁve reportedT
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thinking in the form of words/phrases and ﬁve re-
ported thinking in complete sentences.
Other characteristics
Sz-AVHs and controls did not diﬀer in reported speed
of inner speech (slow, normal rate, speeded up) with
both groups more likely to report thoughts at a normal
speaking rate. Most participants, patient or control,
considered their inner thoughts mostly or always in-
telligible to others.
The pragmatics of inner speech in Sz-AVHs and
controls
Table 3 summarizes percentages of patients and con-
trols who reported inner speech as if talking to oneself,
and usage of own name and various pronouns
(‘ I ’, ‘you’ and ‘he/she’) when addressing self in inner
speech.
In response to the ﬁrst question, ‘When you are
thinking silently about things, is it ever like you’re
talking to yourself in your mind’, there was a trend
(p=0.10) towards Sz-AVHs saying ‘no’ more often
than controls. In response to the follow-up question,
‘ Is it like you’re talking directly to yourself, telling
yourself what you need to do or commenting on
what’s happening? ’, there was no group diﬀerence,
with the majority of both groups (79% patients, 76%
controls) answering in the aﬃrmative. The diﬀerent
results for the two questions may reﬂect less ambi-
guity in the follow-up question. Participants who re-
ported that they did experience inner speech as talking
directly to themselves were then asked a series of
questions on the form of references to self. There were
no diﬀerences between Sz-AVHs and controls in the
tendency to use their own name (approximately half
of each group reported doing this) or in the tendency
to use the pronoun ‘you’ (used by about half of each
group) or ‘ I ’ (used by about two-thirds of each group).
The use of ‘he/she’ to refer to self when talking to
oneself in inner speech was not reported at all by
controls, and by only three Sz-AVHs.
Table 3. Aspects of talking to oneself in inner speech
Question
% patients
saying yes
% controls
saying yes p
When you are thinking silently about things, is it ever like you’re talking to yourself
in your mind? Sort of talking through to yourself whatever’s on your mind?
74 90 0.10
Is it like you’re talking directly to yourself, telling yourself what you need to do or
commenting on what’s happening?
79 76 1.00
IF YES:
When you are thinking silently to yourself in this way – that is, like you’re talking
directly to yourself in your mind – do you ever use your own name?
50 60 0.58
Do you tend to talk to yourself in your mind using the word ‘you ’? That is, do you
ﬁnd yourself saying things in your mind like ‘You’d better do such and such now’?
57 50 0.78
Do you tend to talk to yourself in your mind using the word ‘ I ’ ? That is, do you ﬁnd
yourself saying things in your mind like ‘ I’d better do such and such now’?
67 80 0.32
Would you ever talk to yourself in your mind like this saying ‘he/she ’ to refer to
yourself ? For example, ‘He’s got to do such and such now’?
14 0 0.06
When you’re talking to yourself about things in your mind, is it ever like you’re
having a conversation with yourself? Like you’re going back and forward
asking yourself questions and then answering them?
46 69 0.08
IF YES :
Think about what it’s like when you talk back and forward to yourself like that in
your mind, asking yourself questions and then answering them.
Do you ever use your own name when it’s like that ? 36 36 1.00
Do you use the word ‘ I ’ – do you think things like ‘ I could do such and such now’
and then answer the same way ‘Or maybe I could do …. ’?
100 75 0.15
Or is it more like you talk about yourself in the third person when it’s like this – e.g.
say ‘He/she could try this now’ – and then answer back saying ‘He/she
shouldn’t try that – it won’t work. ’ ?
8 0 0.30
When you’re talking to yourself like this, asking and then answering questions about
something, do you ever use ‘You ’? For example, say things like ‘You should
try this now’ and then answer back?
45 55 0.72
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The next questions probed the dialogic nature of
inner speech. Participants were asked ‘When you’re
talking to yourself about things in your mind, is it ever
like you’re having a conversation with yourself? Like
you’re going back and forward asking yourself ques-
tions and then answering them?’ There was a trend
(p=0.08) for controls (69%) to be more likely to answer
in the aﬃrmative to this question than Sz-AVHs
(46%). The 12 patients and 29 controls who answered
in the aﬃrmative were then probed further on the
properties of this internal conversation. No signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were found between Sz-AVHs and con-
trols in the frequency with which inner speech took
the form of conversation (the most frequent answer
in both groups being ‘sometimes’), or the tendency to
use ‘you’ (about half of each group using this) or ‘he/
she’ (with all but one patient denying any use of ‘he/
she’) in such internal conversation. All Sz-AVHs re-
ported using ‘ I ’ in their internal conversation, as did
the majority of controls.
Concordances between inner speech and AVHs in
patients
The hypothesized negative association between
frequency of inner speech and frequency of voices in
Sz-AVHs was not found; the non-parametric corre-
lation (having excluded one patient with an ‘unsure ’
response) was non-signiﬁcant (t=0.12, N.S.). We also
examined correlations between frequency of inner
speech and other symptom ratings in patients and all
results were non-signiﬁcant.
With regard to the concordances of speed, volume
and intelligibility of patients’ inner speech with voices,
all correlation results were non-signiﬁcant (p’s>0.05).
With regard to the concordances concerning vocal
characteristics of inner speech and voices, only 11/29
patients and 12/49 healthy controls reported inner
speech that sometimes had the sound quality of a
voice. That so few participants reported any inner
speech with vocal characteristics ruled out our con-
sideration of concordance in this regard between the
Sz-AVHs’ inner speech and their voices.
Table 4 shows the relationship between the tend-
ency for Sz-AVHs to experience their AVHs as talking
to them directly and their tendency to talk directly
to themselves in their own thoughts. There was no
association between these two variables.
There was also no relationship between Sz-AVHs’
use of their own name in self-directed inner speech
(e.g. ‘ John, take the garbage out now’) and their name
being heard in second-person AVHs. Similarly, there
was no relationship between Sz-AVHs’ use of second-
person pronouns in their self-directed inner speech
(e.g. ‘You should move the milk’) and their tendency
to hear second-person voices addressing them in a
similar way (e.g. ‘You should take the bread’).
We also found no association between the tendency
for Sz-AVHs to hear voices conversing and their
tendency to experience inner speech as having a con-
versation with oneself (p>0.05). We also examined the
relationship between the patients’ use of personal
names in dialogic inner speech and their tendency to
hear voices using their names in conversation about
them and there was again no relationship. Of the three
Sz-AVHs who reported using ‘he/she’ to refer to self
in inner speech, only one also reported third-person
AVHs.
A number of further analyses were performed on
the patient data. First, when the inner speech of
Sz-AVHs who reported their voices once a week or
more was compared to that of Sz-AVHs who heard
their voices less frequently, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
on any of the previously discussed properties of inner
speech were found. Second, inner speech was com-
pared between Sz-AVHs who only experienced
voices commenting and Sz-AVHs who experienced
voices conversing (either alone or in combination
with voices commenting), as well as comparing
both groups to the controls. No group diﬀerences
Table 4. Self-directed inner speech and AVH properties in patients
Question
Does it feel like your voice (i.e.
AVH) is talking directly to you?
pNo Yes
When you are thinking silently about things, is it ever
like you’re talking to yourself in your mind?
No 1 6 0.72
Yes 3 17
Is it like you’re talking directly to yourself, telling yourself
what you need to do or commenting on what’s happening?
No 0 6 0.55
Yes 6 18
AVH, Auditory verbal hallucination.
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concerning any properties of inner speech as dis-
cussed above were found, and the relationships be-
tween the phenomenological characteristics of voices
and inner speech within both patient groups were
again non-signiﬁcant. As Fernyhough (2004) suggests
that AVHs result when condensed inner speech is re-
expanded under conditions of stress and cognitive
challenge, we focused on the 16 Sz-AVHs who re-
ported their voices as more likely when feeling stres-
sed or negative and compared these to the 13 patients
who did not (and also the healthy controls). The pa-
tient groups diﬀered on only one variable : Sz-AVHs
who reported AVHs that were not associated with
feeling stressed or negative were more likely to report
using ‘you’ in inner speech (p<0.05).
Power analyses
As no discernable diﬀerences between the inner
speech reported by Sz-AVHs and healthy controls
were found, we report on power analyses. The smal-
lest eﬀect size that each of the analyses shown in
Table 2 could detect (at b=0.80) was approximately
w=0.35, which is a medium eﬀect size (Clark-Carter,
1997). The analyses performed in Table 3 were able
(at b=0.80) to detect eﬀect sizes of between w=0.35
and w=0.45, which would be considered medium to
large. As the number of participants in Table 4 was
smaller, as dictated by responses to earlier questions,
these analyses only had the ability (at b=0.80) to de-
tect an eﬀect size of w=0.51, which is a large eﬀect
size.
Discussion
This study set out to address a number of questions
about the quantity, form and pragmatics of inner
speech in Sz-AVHs and healthy controls, as well as the
concordance between the phenomenological qualities
of Sz-AVHs’ voices and their inner speech. Before
discussing the results concerning our speciﬁc hypoth-
eses, we note that all but one participant (a patient)
reported some frequency of inner speech.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that inner speech would be
less frequent in Sz-AVHs than in controls. We found
little evidence consistent with this. Although controls
predominantly reported thinking things over in their
mind as occurring several times a day, patients were
more varied; proportionally more patients than con-
trols reported inner speech that was non-stop/always-
thinking and proportionally more patients reported
infrequent levels of inner speech (once a day or less).
We found no eﬀects on frequency when patients who
heard many voices were compared to those who did
not. Thus the present data oﬀer little support for the
hypothesis of Lysaker & Lysaker (2005) that patients
with AVHs should experience less inner speech than
controls.
We also found no evidence that thinking in com-
plete sentences would be less likely in Sz-AVHs.
Approximately 60% of both Sz-AVHs and healthy
controls reported thinking in complete sentences, with
no group diﬀerences. Similarly, no diﬀerences existed
between the two groups in terms of other character-
istics of inner speech, such as intelligibility, speed and
the pragmatics of inner speech. We did, however, ﬁnd
a non-signiﬁcant trend towards fewer patients with
AVHs than controls reporting dialogic inner speech
(i.e. inner speech as a back-and-forth conversation).
In terms of the relationship between the inner
speech and the voices of Sz-AVHs, we found no evi-
dence of a negative association between frequency of
inner speech and frequency of voices. We had also
hypothesized concordance between the phenomeno-
logical qualities of Sz-AVHs’ voices and their inner
speech. By contrast, we found no relationship between
the speed, volume and intelligibility of patients’ inner
speech and their voices. Concordances between the
vocal characteristics of inner speech and Sz-AVHs’
voices could not be examined because the majority of
such individuals (in line with controls) reported inner
speech being more like words in the head than a voice
in the head.
Furthermore, we found no relationship between the
tendency for Sz-AVHs to experience their AVHs as
talking to them directly and their tendency to talk di-
rectly to themselves in their own thoughts. Similarly,
there was no relationship between the tendency for
Sz-AVHs to hear voices conversing and their tendency
to experience thinking as having a conversation with
oneself. There were also no concordances between
the usage of personal names, second-person or third-
person pronouns in inner speech and the frequency
with which similar terms of address were used by
voices.
A number of caveats need to be acknowledged
about the above ﬁndings. First, there is a history of
questioning the reliability and validity of data ob-
tained from introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
However, the conscious nature of verbal thought
makes it plausible that such an experience can be re-
liably reported. Moreover, Hurlburt & Heavey (2001)
argue that concerns about introspection ought not to
lead us to dismiss the approach altogether ; rather
we ought to improve techniques as with the experi-
ence-sampling methods of Hurlburt (1990). We hence
recommend future studies using such alternate tech-
niques. A further potential problem was that some of
the analyses performed only had the power to detect
medium to large eﬀects. That said, if all AVHs arise as
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misattributed inner speech, we would expect such ef-
fects to be considerable. Nevertheless, we would call
for replication of our ﬁndings in larger samples of
Sz-AVHs.
It might also be argued that the incidence of thought
disorder might have aﬀected the reliability of patients’
reporting. However, our sample had very low levels of
thought disorder, and patients were recruited with the
need for coherent thought reporting in mind. Another
potential problem is that patients with very frequent
AVHs may have had problems in distinguishing be-
tween their own thoughts and their AVHs. However,
if this were to be the case we would have expected
patients with more frequent AVHs to report their
inner speech to be more similar to their AVHs than
patients with less frequent AVHs. This pattern was not
found, consistent with our observations that patients
had no diﬃculties with distinguishing between their
inner-speech and their voice-hearing experiences.
Several further ﬁndings, beyond those speciﬁc to
our study hypotheses, are also worthy of discussion.
Because all but one of our Sz-AVHs reported some
frequency of inner speech, the question arises as to
when a patient’s inner speech remains experienced as
such and when it becomes misattributed to an external
source. There was no evidence in our study that the
mood or aﬀect associated with hearing voices might
explain this. Unlike one of the patients studied by
Hurlburt (1990), as referred to in the introduction, few
participants reported their inner speech with any
vocal characteristics. This was alongside : (a) 23 of the
29 Sz-AVHs being able to identify the gender of their
voices ; (b) only six patients reporting voices that were
always the same gender as themselves ; and (c) 14 Sz-
AVHs reporting being able to identify who was
speaking to them. A comprehensive inner-speech
theory of AVHs would need to account for the origin
of vocal characteristics concerning gender and identity
of voices. A further complication for any comprehen-
sive inner-speech account of AVHs is that 20 of our
patients reported answering their voices (hence ac-
knowledging their ownership and agency related to
their responses to the voices). Even more challenging
for an inner-speech account of AVHs, 12 of these
patients reported answering their voices in their own
thoughts and not out loud.
The non-signiﬁcant trend (commented upon earlier)
towards fewer Sz-AVHs than controls reporting
dialogic inner speech might be taken to oﬀer some
support for an inner-speech account of voices con-
versing. However, our ﬁndings concerning the use of
third-person pronouns in inner speech are counter to
this view; most participants, patient or control, denied
using ‘he/she’ to refer to self in dialogic inner speech.
Indeed, only three patients, of whom only one re-
ported third-person voices, reported using ‘he/she’ to
refer to self in inner speech, whether this took the
form of dialogic conversation or talking to oneself.
This occurred despite 14 of the Sz-AVHs reporting
hearing voices conversing about them, eight of whom
also reported that their voices used third-person pro-
nouns when discussing them. By contrast, the use of
personal names and ﬁrst-person and second-person
pronouns was fairly common in inner speech.
Nevertheless, there were no relationship between the
patients’ use of such terms in their inner speech and
the use of similar terms of address by the patients’
voices.
In conclusion, the present study is the ﬁrst to sys-
tematically investigate the phenomenological qualities
of verbal thought in Sz-AVHs and non-voice-hearing
healthy adults. It is also the ﬁrst to examine con-
cordances between inner-speech and voice-hearing
experiences in Sz-AVHs. We found no discernable
diﬀerences between the verbal thought reported by
Sz-AVHs and healthy controls. Such a ﬁnding is com-
patible with the inner-speech theory of AVHs, which
predicts that the self-monitoring of inner speech
is defective, but that inner speech per se need not be
unusual. However, if inner speech, conceived as
the act of internal self-talk, is the raw material of all
AVHs, then there should be similarities between the
phenomenological characteristics of patients’ verbal
thought and their AVHs. We found no evidence to
support this prediction.
Our ﬁndings also highlight several issues that need
to be addressed by proponents of an inner-speech
theory of AVHs. These include that : Sz-AVHs and
non-voice-hearing healthy adults rarely report inner
speech as having vocal characteristics ; Sz-AVHs often
answer their voices in their own mind, thus raising
questions as to why they do not also misattribute
authorship of these internal responses to the voices ;
and third-person pronouns are rarely reported in
verbal thought. The latter ﬁnding seems particularly
problematic for an inner-speech account of voices
conversing.
Based on our ﬁndings, a unitary inner-speech
theory of all AVHs seems unlikely. Perhaps inner
speech is just one of many forms of internal event
(including verbal memories, for example) that can
be misattributed externally to cause AVHs. In future
work, we aim to focus more speciﬁcally on evaluating
an inner-speech account of voices commenting. To
better evaluate such an account, we aim to collect
more substantial normative data concerning the
phenomenological qualities of inner speech using
questionnaires, as well as using experience sampling
techniques to elicit richer qualitative data concerning
such experiences in the healthy population.
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